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SUCCESSOR CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR IMPROPER 

DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Improper disposal of hazardous waste promises to be an enor­
mous source of corporate liability. Between thirty and fifty thousand 
improperly managed hazardous waste disposal sites currently exist in 
the country. I Estimates of the cost of cleaning up these dumpsites 
range between 72 and 44 billion dollars.3 In 1980, Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil­
ity Act, which says that companies responsible for generating hazard­
ous wastes found at existing dumpsites must pay for the cost of 
cleaning them Up.4 It seems inevitable, however, that some of the re­
sponsible companies will no longer be in existence and available for 
suit. This comment will discuss the question of whether a company 
which buys substantially all of the assets of a corporation which pro­
duced hazardous waste which was improperly disposed of should be 
held liable for the cost of cleaning up its predecessor's5 wastes. Recent 
cases in which successor corporations6 have been held liable for defec­
tive products manufactured by their predecessors will be drawn on. 
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
A. The Traditional Rule 
Traditional corporate law says that when one corporation sells all 
or substantially all of its assets to another corporation, the successor 
corporation is not responsible for the debts and liabilities of its prede-
I. United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
2. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1980). 
3. 126 CONGo REC. H9177 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Railsback). 
4. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a) (1982). The Act also imposes liability on transportors of haz­
ardous substances and on owners and operators of disposal facilities. Id. 
5. For purposes of this comment a predecessor corporation is a corporation that sells 
substantially all of the assets used in the manufacture of a line of products. Cf BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BLACK'S]' 
6. For purposes of this comment a successor corporation is a corporation which buys 
from an existing enterprise substantially all of the assets used in the manufacture of a line of 
products. Cj. BLACK'S, supra note 5, at 1283. 
909 
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cessor, including those arising out of the latter's tortious conduct.7 
Two reasons exist for limiting the purchaser's liability: to facilitate the 
flow of capital by providing the buyer with certainty;8 and to support 
the property law principle that a purchaser who has no notice of prior ­
claims and gives adequate consideration gets clear title.9 
There are four generally recognized exceptions to this rule. The 
purchasing corporation may be held responsible for the liabilities of its 
predecessor if (1) it expressly or impliedly agrees to assume them; (2) 
the transaction is actually a consolidation or merger of the two compa­
nies; (3) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller; or (4) the 
purpose of the transaction was fraudulently to escape responsibility for 
the seller's liabilities.lO The traditional rule does not, however, make 
any provision for claims that arise subsequent to the transfer. I I 
Products liability is one situation in which claims can arise 
against a corporation that has sold all of its assets, and is either de­
funct or nothing more than an assetless paper shell. Until recently, 
people injured by products manufactured by a company that no longer 
existed often found themselves left without a remedy. They would not 
be able to recover from the company that bought out the original man­
ufacturer unless the transaction fell into one of the above-mentioned 
categories. 12 Some courts have recently begun to address the problem 
either by expanding the traditional exceptions to the non-liability 
rule13 or by holding the traditional rule inapplicable to products liabil­
7. McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 551, 561, 264 A.2d 98, 101 (Law 
Div. 1970). 
8. Ray v. A1ad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 25, 560 P.2d 3, 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 
(1977). 
9. Note, Liability of a Successor Corporation for Products Defectively Manufactured 
by a Predecessor, 62 NEB. L. REV. 408, 411 (1983); Comment, The Product Line Theory of 
Corporate Successor Products Liability: An Evaluation After Ramirez v. Amsted Industries. 
Inc., 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 393 (1983). 
10. E.g. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 340-41, 431 A.2d 811, 815 
(1981). 
11. The precise time at which a claim arises is often difficult to determine, since 
injury, knowledge, and suit do not occur simultaneously. For purposes of this discussion, 
however, a claim can be considered to have arisen prior to the transfer whenever the selling 
corporation was unaware of the claim at the time of the sale. 
12. McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super 555, 561, 264 A.2d 98, 101 (Law 
Div. 1970); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556,558 
(1975). They might still be able to recover from a retail or wholesale seller of the product, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977), but in that case the middleman is 
deprived of its action over against the manufacturer. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,33, 
560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977). In either case the manufacturer avoids the 
consequences of its tortious behavior. 
13. E.g. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (expanding the 
mere continuation exception); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 
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ity c1aims.14 
Two justifications exist for the imposition of liability on the suc­
cessor. First, it furthers the policies behind the imposition of strict 
products liability}S Second, the successor's action in buying all the 
predecessor's assets destroyed the plaintiff's chance of recovering from 
the predecessor. The courts that have held successor corporations lia­
ble have favored the first justification. 16 
B. Strict Products Liability 
The imposition of strict products liability attempts to achieve two 
goals: to reduce the likelihood of injury by fixing responsibility for it 
on the party in the best position to prevent it;17 and to mitigate the 
potentially "overwhelming misfortune to the person injured" by plac­
ing liability on the party in a position to distribute the cost of the 
injury among all users of the product. IS Put differently, the purpose of 
strict products liability is to force the manufacturer to internalize and 
spread throughout society the risk of injury due to defective products. 
If, however, the manufacturer of a defective product can escape liabil­
ity for the injury by selling its assets and distributing the proceeds to 
its shareholders, then it will not have internalized the risk, and these 
goals will not be achieved. 
Preventing evasion of the goals of strict products liability necessi­
tates preventing the manufacturer from liquidating and distributing its 
assets without making any provision for products liability claims that 
may arise in the future. This could be accomplished by requiring man­
ufacturing corporations that intend to dissolve themselves either to 
(3rd Cir. 1974), cerro denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (expanding the de facto merger 
exception). 
14. Ray v. Alad Corp, 19 Cal. 3d 22,560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner 
v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); Ramirez v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332,431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dowejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. 
Super. 15,434 A.2d 106 (1981). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
16. The holdings of both Ramirez and Ray impose liability only when the successor 
continues the manufacturing operation of the predecessor. Neither holding, however, spe­
cifically requires that the successor be responsible for the destruction of the plaintiff's rem­
edy against the predecessor. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 22, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582; 
Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. See infra text accompanying notes 22-26. 
17. Strict liability should be imposed on the party "in the best position to make the 
cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidence costs and to act on that 
decision once it is made." Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in 
Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
18. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring). 
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purchase products liability insurance for a specified number of years or 
to leave some assets which could be reached if a claim were to arise.l 9 
Only the legislature, however, could implement this approach. 20 
An alternative way to prevent a corporation from escaping its re­
sponsibility by selling its assets is to hold the purchaser of the assets 
liable. As long as the purchaser knows that it is also acquiring any 
potential liability ,21 the estimated amount of liability being transferred 
will reduce the purchase price. The potential cost of injuries then re­
mains internalized with the predecessor. 
The California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp.22 and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. 23 
applied this approach. The Ray court held that 
a party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the 
output of its line of products under the circumstances here 
presented assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same 
product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity 
from which the business was acquired.24 
The Ramirez court similarly held25 
that where one corporation acquires all or substantially all the man­
ufacturing assets of another corporation. . . and undertakes essen­
tially the same manufacturing operation ... [it will be] ... strictly 
liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, 
even if previously manufactured and distributed by the selling cor­
. 26po ratIOn .... 
Both courts relied on two rationales: first, the successor's ability 
to take on the predecessor's risk-spreading role; and second, the fair­
ness of requiring the successor to assume responsibility for the prede­
cessor's defective products. The courts treated the responsibility as a 
19. Because promoting the transferability of capital is also a legitimate concern, the 
period for which the predecessor must remain responsible could be limited. 
20. The Illinois Appellate Court, while refusing to impose liability on a successor 
corporation, suggested that the legislature bears the responsibility of dealing with the prob­
lem. Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1151,433 N.E.2d 
1104,1112 (1982). 
21. In most cases discused here the successor had no knowledge of potential liability. 
For a discussion of the problems with retroactive application of the rule, see infra notes 28­
31 and accompanying text. 
22. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). 
23. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332,431 A.2d 811 (1981). 
24. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 22, 560 P.2d at II, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. 
25. There is, however, one important difference which will be discussed below in the 
text accompanying notes 34-35. 
26. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. 
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burden attached to the good will which the successor bought.27 The 
opinions would be more persuasive, however, if the courts had focused 
on the predecessor and argued that it must be prevented from escaping 
liability, instead offocusing on the successor and attempting to explain 
why it should be liable. The objective is to force the predecessor to 
internalize the cost of injuries due to defective products. Imposing 
liability on the successor simply constitutes one way of achieving that 
result. 
Imposing liability on the successor as a way of forcing the prede­
cessor to internalize the cost works only if the successor knows of the 
potential liability at the time of the acquisition. Otherwise the 
purchase price will not be reduced in accordance with the assumption 
of liability and the predecessor will still have avoided its responsibility. 
It is also harsh to hold the successor liable if it had no notice of its 
potential liability when it made the acquisition.28 
One justification for retroactive application of successor liability 
was offered in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc. 29 "[T]his kind of surprise is 
endemic in a system where legal principles are applied case by case 
and is no more an injustice than was the retroactive application of the 
strict liability doctrine" when it was first imposed. 30 In Ramirez the 
New Jersey court made the product line rule retroactive to suits in 
progress as of November 15, 1979, the date of the Apellate Division 
decision that the court upheld. Although the court agreed that 
purchasing corporations could reasonably have relied on the previous 
rule of non-liability, it concluded that those who had exercised the 
initiative to challenge the rule should be rewarded by having their 
claims upheld. 31 
27. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 
349, 431 A.2d at 820. 
28. Subrogating the successor to the plaintitrs claim against the original manufac­
turer might remove some of the unfairness. Although by hypothesis the original manufac­
turer is not available for suit, the" claim may not be entirely worthless. New Jersey's 
corporate dissolution statute allows "a creditor who shows good cause for not having previ­
ously filed his claim" to proceed against the dissolved corporation's shareholders. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-13 (West Supp. 1984-85). If the injury occurred after the dissolu­
tion, a products liability plaintiff would certainly have good cause for not bringing his claim 
earlier. But locating and collecting from scattered individual shareholders could be very 
difficult. 
29. 501 F.2d : 145 (1st Cir. 1974). 
30. Id. at 1154. 
31. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 357, 431 A.2d at 824. Judge Schreiber, concurring, dis­
agreed. He believed that fairness to the purchasing corporation required that the rule 
should apply only when the acquisition took place after November 15, 1979, the date of the 
Appellate Division decision in Ramirez. Id. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., 
concurring). 
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The justifications for retroactive application of successor liability 
offered by the Cyr and Ramirez courts are not based on any culpability 
on the part of the successor corporation and, therefore, are not partic­
ularly persuasive. There is, however, a second rationale for the impo­
sition of successor liability. It is arguable that by participating in a 
transaction which it knew would cause future plaintiffs to be deprived 
of a remedy, the successor has acted culpably. If culpability on the 
part of the successor can be established, then retroactive imposition of 
liabiliaty is less harsh, particularly because the alternative is to leave 
an innocent victim without a remedy. 
C. Destruction of Remedy 
The second rationale for holding a successor corporation liable 
for its predecessor's defective products recognizes the successor's re­
sponsibility for destroying the plaintiff's chance of recovering from the 
predecessor. Both the Ray and Ramirez courts stated that the defend­
ants destroyed the plaintiff's remedy against the original manufacturer 
by acquiring the predecessor's assets32 and both courts say that this is 
part of the justification for the imposition of liability.33 One important 
difference, however, exits between the two opinions. The holding in 
Ramirez does not explicitly make responsibility for the plaintiff's loss 
of remedy a prerequisite to the imposition of liability on the succes­
sor.34 The holding in Ray does not mention destruciton of remedy 
either, but it leaves room for inclusion of the concept because the court 
limited the holding to "the circumstances here presented."35 It is, 
therefore, not clear whether California would hold a successor corpo­
ration liable if it were not responsible for the plaintiff's loss of remedy. 
It is clear, however, that New Jersey will. Nieves v. Bruno Sherman 
Corp. ,36 a companion case to Ramirez, illustrated the court's 
willingness. 
Plaintiff Nieves lost his arm when it was crushed by a die-cutting 
press manufactured by the Sheridan Company. Twelve years earlier, 
Sheridan had dissoved itself after having sold substantially all of its 
32. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 31-32, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580; Ramirez, 86 N.J. 
at 350, 431 A.2d at 820. 
33. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80; Ramirez, 86 N.J. 
at 349,431 A.2d at 820. 
34. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. The holding is quoted above in text 
accompanying note 26. 
35. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The holding is 
quoted above in text accompanying note 24. 
36. 86 N.J. 361,431 A.2d 826 (1981). 
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assets to Harris-Intertype Corp., which continued the same manufac­
turing operation. Four years before Nieves' accident, Harris sold all 
the assets used in the manufacture of the presses to Bruno Sherman 
Corp., which in tum continued to manufacture the same line of 
presses. Harris, however, remained in existence and continued to 
manufacture other products.37 The plaintiff sought to recover from 
both Harris and Bruno Sherman. 38 
Applying the Ramirez analysis, the court found that Bruno Sher­
man enjoyed the benefit of Sheridan's goodwill39 and that it had Sheri­
dan's capacity to estimate the risks due to its defective products and to 
bear the costs of minimizing or avoiding those accidents.4O The court 
found Bruno Sherman liable,41 even though it had not in any way re­
duced the plaintiff's chance of recovering for his injuries. The corpo­
ration from which it had acquired the manufacturing assets remained 
viable and available for suit.42 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognizes that it is a pioneer in 
"advancing the principle of enterprise liability and the philosophy of 
spreading [throughout society] the cost of injuries from defective prod­
uctS."43 It is, therefore, not surprising for it to rule that the policies 
underlying strict products liability constitute a sufficient justification 
for the imposition of liability on a successor corporation. More con­
servative courts, however, may refuse to find liability unless the plain­
tiffs establish a sufficient connection between the defendant's actions 
and their harm.44 Plaintiffs may be able to satisfy this nexus require­
ment by showing that the defendant was a party to a transaction that 
it had reason to know would deprive future plaintiffs of remedies.45 
In the acquisition of a manufacturing enterprise, the buyer knows 
37. Id. at 365-66, 431 A.2d at 828-29. 
38. Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 829. 
39. Id. at 368-69, 431 A.2d at 830. 
40. Id. at 369, 431 A.2d at 830-31. 
41. Id. at 368, 431 A.2d at 830. 
42. Id. at 364, 431 A.2d at 828. The court held that Harris should also be liable 
because it was part of the overall enterprise "that should bear the cost of injuries resulting 
from defective products." Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831. The court left the division ofliabil­
ity between the two defendants to the terms of the purchase and sale agreement. Id. at 372, 
431 A.2d at 832. 
43. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 336-37. 431 A.2d at 813. 
44. Phillips, Products liability ofSuccessor Corporations: A Corporate and Commer­
cial Law Perspective, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 272 (1982). Recent cases refusing to hold a 
successor corporation liable include: Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. 
App.3d 1141, 1151,433 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (1982); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 
211 Neb. 724, 729-30, 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (1982); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 
N.Y.2d 239, 245, 451 N.E.2d 195, 198,464 N.Y.S.2d 437,440. 
45. Phillips, supra note 44, at 272. 
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the nature of the products that the seller has put into the stream of 
commerce and so should also know if products liability claims are 
likely to arise. The buyer generally would also know whether the 
seller would be available and able to satisfy those claims. Frequently 
the purchase and sale agreement requires the seller to dissolve after the 
sale.46 If the successor corporation knows that claims will arise, and 
knows that the assets it is acquiring constitute the only assets available 
to satisfy those claims, then it is not harsh to hold the successor re­
sponsible for them. 
The traditional rule of corporate law47 should be modified so that 
whenever the successor knowingly eliminates the possibility of recov­
ery from its predecessor, it assumes liability for claims that will 
foreseeably arise against the predecessor. The suggested modification 
would simply expand the fourth exception to the traditional rule of 
non-liability, which says that the successor will be liable if the purpose 
of the transaction was fraudulently to escape responsibility for the 
seller's liabilities.48 Many successor corporations may not be liable 
under the traditional formulation of the exception, however, because 
the parties made the transaction for business reasons and not for the 
purpose of escaping liability for defective products. 
The proposed rule expands the exception to cover not only the 
situation in which the purpose of the transaction was to escape liability 
but also the situation in which the purchaser should have been aware 
at the time of the transaction that as a side effect of the transaction the 
selling corporation would escape a foreseeable liability. Imposing the 
proposed rule retroactively represents less harshness than the plight of 
the victim left without a remedy. The loss should fall on the party 
who shoulders greater culpability. A corporation that knowingly de­
prives a person of a remedy for a foreseeable claim bears some culpa­
bility whereas a victim assumes none. 
One limitation, however, should be placed on the liability of the 
successor corporation. The value of the assets acquired in the transac­
tion should mark its maximum liability. If a predecessor's assets 
before the transfer would have been insufficient to satisfy the claim, 
46. The transaction at issue in Ray included a dissolution provision. Ray, 19 Cal. 3d 
at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577. 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. 
48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The purpose test represents a basic 
principle of fraudulent conveyance law. "Every conveyance made ... with actual intent, 
as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or 
future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 109A, § 7 (West 1958). 
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then the successor is not the cause of the plaintiff's inability to recover. 
If liability were imposed regardless of the extent of the predecessor's 
assets, some viable businesses will be forced to liquidate because no 
one would be willing to buy them.49 Limiting the purchaser's liability 
to the value of the assets received in the acquisition would eliminate 
this restriction on transferability without reducing any future plain­
tiff's chance of recovering. Since the value of the predecessor's assets 
limits the extent of any recovery from it, logic requires that recovery 
from the successor should be subject to the same limits. Just as the 
successor should not be allowed to destroy a future plaintiff's chances 
of recovery, it should not be required to increase them. 50 
III. HAZARDOUS WASTE 
A. PSC Resources 
Although Ray and Ramirez only held successor corporations re­
sponsible for their predecessor's defective products,51 one commenta­
tor, Kadens, has said that the real significance of the cases extending 
liability for defective products to successor corporations may be the 
"future assist rendered to a wide host of special creditors."52 His pre­
diction came true in New Jersey Department of Transportation v. PSC 
Resources.53 
In 1973, defendant PSC Resources purchased 100% of the stock 
of the Diamond Head Refining Co., Inc. PSC then transferred all of 
Diamond Head's assets to itself and dissolved Diamond Head. Dia­
mond Head had operated a waste oil reprocessing facility which dis­
charged oily wastes, sludge, and contaminated waste water into a 
nearby body of water. PSC continued to operate the facility and con­
tinued the practice of discharging the waste. In 1977, plaintiff Depart­
ment of Transportation began construction of a highway. In order to 
do so, it had to clean up the sludge and contaminated water created by 
the defendant's facility. The cost of cleanup approached five million 
dollars. 54 The court found that the policy rationale for the imposition 
of strict liability in a defective product action equally applied under 
the present circumstances. Quoting the opinion of the Appellate Divi­
49. Whenever the estimated potential liability of a company exceeds its value as a 
going concern, it will be impossible to sell the company. 
50. Cj Phillips, supra note 44, at 271. 
51. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
52. Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment ofSeller's Products Liabilities in Assets 
Acquisitions, 10 U. ToL. L. REV. I, 45 (1978). 
53. 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Law Div. 1980). 
54. Id. at 450-52, 419 A.2d at 1152-53. 
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sion in Ramirez,55 the court held that "where 'the successor corpora­
tion acquires all or substantially all the assets of the predecessor 
corporation for cash and continues essentially the same operation as 
the predecessor corporation' . . . the successor incurs liability for the 
damages resulting from any discharge of hazardous substances by its 
predecessor. "56 
By adopting the Ramirez approach, the court based its decision 
on the principle underlying strict liability: that costs associated with 
an enterprise should be borne by those in a position to minimize the 
harm and spread whatever cost remains among the users of the prod­
uct. 57 This policy applies as strongly to hazardous waste disposal as it 
does to products liability. Just as the manufacturer of a product can 
best ensure its safety, the generator of hazardous waste can best insure 
proper disposal. The generator is also in a position to spread the costs 
among the users of the product of which the waste is a by-product. 
This policy will be frustrated, however, if the generator can escape 
liability be selling its assets and distributing the proceeds among its 
shareholders. 
The second justification for imposing liability on a successor cor­
poration, the conscious destruction of a future plaintiff's remedy 
against the predecessor, may not be as strong as to liability for hazard­
ous waste as for defective products. Liability for improper disposal of 
hazardous waste did not present a major issue until recently. 58 A suc­
cessor's lack of knowledge that claims were likely to arise weakens the 
justification for holding it responsible because it destroyed the plain­
tiff's remedy. The situation may be different, however, for more recent 
acq uisi tions. 
The destruction of remedy justification may not be essential in 
jurisdictions such as New Jersey that favor the theory of enterprise 
liability.59 More conservative courts, however, may refuse to find lia­
bility unless the successor knowingly deprived future plaintiffs of a 
remedy.60 The extent to which more conservative courts will hold 
successor corporations liable may, therefore, depend on the extent to 
55. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision had not yet been published. 
56. PSC Resources, 175 N.J. Super at 467,419 A.2d at 1162 (quoting Ramirez v. 
Amsted Industries, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 278, 408 A.2d 818, 827 (App. Div,. 1979». 
57. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
58. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
42 USC § 9601-657 (1982) (enacted in 1980). 
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
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which those courts believe that the successors should have been aware 
of the likelihood of future claims. 
B. Chern-Dyne 
Another factor, however, might weigh in favor of holding succes­
sor corporations liable: the imposition of joint and several liability 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).61 In United States v. Chern-Dyne 
Corp. ,62 the district court held that CERCLA does provide for joint 
and several liability.63 The government sued twenty-four defendants 
who allegedly contributed to the same waste disposal site. The defend­
ants moved for an early determination that they were not jointly and 
severally liable for the clean-up costS.64 The district court found that 
CERCLA's language was ambiguous as to whether joint and several 
liability should apply and then looked to the Act's legislative history 
to decide the question.65 A sponsor, Senator Randolph, said that "we 
have deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on 
common law principles to determine when parties would be severally 
liable."66 Although it recognized that in some situations the deletion 
of language from a statute "strongly militates against a judgment that 
Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact,"67 the 
Chern-Dyne court said that "[t]he term joint and several liability was 
deleted from the express language of the statute in order to avoid its 
universal application to inappropriate circumstances."68 The court 
decided that the legislature intented that common law principles 
should be followed when deciding whether a particular defendant 
would be held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA. 69 
The court then faced the question of whether it should apply the 
law of the forum state or if there should be a federally created uniform 
law. The court quoted Representative Florio, who had said that "[t]o 
insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage 
61. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 29607 (1982). 
62. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
63. Id. at 808. 
64. Id. at 804. 
65. Id. at 805. 
66. 126 CONGo REc. S14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Senator 
Randolph). 
67. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807-08 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 
419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974». 
68. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp at 810. 
69. Id. at 808. 
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business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in 
States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further devel­
opment of a Federal common law in this area."70 The court recog­
nized that Erie v. Tompkins71 removed the federal court's power to 
create federal general common law but said that "the power to fashion 
federal specialized common law remains untouched when it is 'neces­
sary to protect uniquely federal interests.' "72 
Having decided that a uniform federal rule should apply, the 
court proceeded to define it. The court followed the approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which bases the decision of whether 
two or more defendants responsible for a single harm are both liable 
for the entire amount of damage on whether the harm is divisible. If 
the harm is not divisible, then the Restatement holds each defendant 
jointly and severally liable. Only if there is a reasonable basis on 
which responsibility for the harm can be apportioned between the two 
defendants will each be liable only for its own share.73 
It may often be very difficult for a defendant to show that the 
harm caused by the various contributors to a hazardous waste disposal 
site is divisible. Even if records showing the volume of waste dumped 
by each defendant are available, uncertainties will still remain about 
the toxicity and migratory potential of the various substances.74 At 
the dumpsite at issue in Chem-Dyne, it was not clear which of the 
wastes had contaminated the groundwater.75 Further complications 
arise because chemicals can react with each other to form new and 
more toxic substances.76 In addition, each defendant has the burden 
of proof as to apportionment,77 so defendants will likely often lose on 
this question. 
If defendants are not able to show that the harm is divisible, then 
each contributor to a particular dumpsite can be held liable for the 
entire cost of cleaning it up. If one contributor has transferred its as­
sets and is no longer available for suit, then either the successor corpo­
ration or the other contributors must pay the defunct corporation's 
share of the costs. Faced with this choice, a court may decide that the 
successor corporation should bear the burden. 
70. Id. at 809 (quoting 126 CONGo REC. Hl1787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement 
of Rep. Florio». 
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
72. Chern-Dyne, S72 F. Supp. at 808 (citations omitted). 
73. [d. at 810; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (1976). 
74. Chern-Dyne, S72 F. Supp. at 811. 
75. [d. 
76. Id. at 805-06. 
77. Id. at 810. 
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In order to choose between imposing liability on a successor cor­
poration or on another contributor, two questions must be answered: 
first, which potential defendant is more at fault; second, which ap­
proach better serves the purpose of preventing this type of harm and 
spreading the cost of any harm that does occur throughout users of the 
product of which the waste is a by-product. CERCLA provides for 
liability without fault,78 soa defendant held jointly and severally liable 
for the cost of cleaning up an entire dumpsite has not necessarily acted 
culpably. The successor corporation might also be innocent, if it had 
not had reason to know that its acquisition would destroy a future 
plaintiff's chance of recovery. If neither defendant is at fault, then the 
decision must be made on the basis of policy. 
Both joint and several liability and successor corporation liability 
achieve the effect of imposing liability on an enterprise as a whole. 
Joint and several liability, however, spreads the burden to many more 
potential defendants. All producers of hazardous waste would then 
share liability. Successor liability, on the other hand, confines liability 
to the same type of manufacturing enterprise. If one purpose of strict 
liability is to internalize costs by making each type of industry pay for 
the damage it causes,79 then the more narrow successor liability ap­
proach should be preferred. Only if a successor corporation cannot be 
found should other contributors to the same dumpsite be forced to 
assume the cost. If it is applied prospectively, a rule imposing liability 
on the successor would clearly be preferable since no unfairness would 
accrue to the successor and the clean up cost would remain internal­
ized with the predecessor. 80 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Two approahcescan be taken to justify the imposition of liability 
on a successor corporation for torts of its predecessor. The first is that 
if the successor discounts the price it is willing to pay for the predeces­
sor's assets in accordance with the potential liability, then the costs 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982) says that the standard ofliability for CERCLA fol­
lows that of 33 U.S.c. § 1321. 33 U.S.c. § 1321(t)(1) (1982) provides that 
except where an owner or operator can prove that a discharge was caused solely 
by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United 
States Government, or (0) an act or omission of a third party. . . such owner or 
operator. . . shall be liable. . . for the actual costs incurred. . . for the removal· 
"At the time of CERCLA's enactment, this section had been interpreted to impose a strict 
liability standard." Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 805. 
79. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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associated with the predecessor's activities will remain internalized 
with the predecessor. Retroactive application is explained as a neces­
sary result in a system in which rules develop on a case by case basis. 
The second explanation for successor liability is that the successor cor­
poration is responsible for destroying the plaintiff's chance of recover­
ing from the predecessor. 
The first rationale applies as strongly to liability for improper dis­
posal of hazardous waste as it does to products liability. The second 
rationale may not apply as strongly to hazardous waste disposal be­
cause the successor may not have had reason to expect that a claim 
would arise against the predecessor. A third reason exists, however, 
for applying successor liability to hazardous waste disposal: it may be 
preferable to hold a successor corporation liable rather than to force 
other contributors to the same dumpsite to pay a dissolved corpora­
tions share of the clean up cost. 
John C. Solomon 
